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We showed 10-second, silent video clips of unfamiliar gubernatorial debates to a group of experimental
participants and asked them to predict the election outcomes. The participants' predictions explain
more than 20 percent of the variation in the actual two-party vote share across the 58 elections in our
study, and their importance survives a range of controls, including state fixed effects. In a horse race
of alternative forecasting models, participants' visual forecasts significantly outperform economic
variables in predicting vote shares, and are comparable in predictive power to a measure of incumbency
status. Adding policy information to the video clips by turning on the sound tends, if anything, to worsen
participants' accuracy, suggesting that naïveté may be an asset in some forecasting tasks.
Daniel J. Benjamin
Institute for Social Research / PO Box 1248
426 Thompson Street




5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
and NBER
jmshapir@uchicago.edu1I n t r o d u c t i o n
From 1988 to 2002, the standard deviation in the two-party vote share in U.S. gubernatorial elec-
tions was 11 percentage points, and the interquartile range was from 42 percent to 55 percent in
favor of the Democratic candidate. Most economic analyses of the predictors of election outcomes
focus on the impact of economic conditions (Fair, 1978; Alesina, Roubini and Cohen, 1997; Wolfers,
2002) and political circumstances (Levitt, 1994; Lee, 2001). Yet, these factors typically leave much
of the overall variation in vote shares unexplained. In addition to the intrinsic value of economet-
ric forecasts (Fair, 1996), understanding the sources of the remaining variation is important if we
believe, as much evidence suggests, that the identity of the oﬃceholder matters for the policies un-
dertaken (Jones and Olken, 2005; Lee, Moretti, and Butler, 2004; Fiorina, 1999; Glaeser, Ponzetto,
and Shapiro, 2005).
In this paper, we test an election forecasting tool based on the predictions of naïve experimental
participants. In our laboratory study, participants saw 10-second, silent video clips from televised
debates in 58 unfamiliar gubernatorial elections from 1988-2002, and guessed the winner of each
election. The use of short selections of video takes advantage of the fact that judgments about other
people from “thin slices”–exposures to expressive behavior as brief as a few seconds–tend to be
highly predictive of reactions to much longer exposures (Ambady and Rosenthal, 1992). This fact
makes it possible to obtain reliable ratings from a large number of participants without requiring
lengthy laboratory sessions.
We ﬁrst use our measure to assess the quality of participants’ forecasts of elections. The share
of participants predicting a Democratic victory is highly related to actual election outcomes, and
can account for more than 20 percent of the variation in two-party vote shares in our sample of
elections. This result survives a wide range of controls, including race, height, and state ﬁxed
eﬀects. A range of tests also conﬁrm that familiarity with the candidates or election outcomes does
not explain our ﬁndings.
After demonstrating the predictive validity of our measure, we compare the predictive power of
participants’ forecasts to that of the economic and political factors typically included in econometric
models of election outcomes. We ﬁnd that, as a forecasting tool, participants’ ratings outperform a
range of models that relate economic circumstances in the state to election outcomes. Turning to
2a comparison with political variables, we ﬁnd that the predictive power of participants’ ratings is
comparable to a measure of the incumbency status of the candidates. A combination of campaign
spending and incumbency status outperforms our measure, although our laboratory-based index
alone achieves more than half of the predictive power of a carefully speciﬁed multivariate model in
predicting the vote shares in our sample of 58 elections.
We turn next to the question of why participants are able to accurately guess election outcomes.
We ﬁrst show that inferences about policy positions do not seem to be driving participants’ success
in predicting outcomes. Participants per f o r m e dp o o r l yi ng u e s s i n gt h ep a r t ya ﬃliations of the
two candidates, and when we allowed participants to hear the sound associated with the video
clips, their ability to guess political positions improved, but their ability to guess election outcomes
worsened.W e a l s o ﬁnd that participants’ ratings of candidate likability, physical attractiveness,
a n dl e a d e r s h i pa r eo n l yw e a k l yr e l a t e dt oe l e c t i o no utcomes, suggesting that participants’ forecasts
of election outcomes capture information beyond these factors. Finally, we investigate whether
participants can detect diﬀerences in candidates’ conﬁdence about winning the election. We show
that participants’ predictions have predictive power even in cases where the election was judged to
be close or a “dead heat” as of the time of the debate, suggesting that participants can predict the
outcome with reasonable success even when there is little reason for one candidate to be especially
conﬁdent.
One possible explanation for the accuracy of participants’ guesses is that their reactions mea-
sure candidates’ charisma or personal appeal, and that these characteristics aﬀect voter behavior
directly. Though we cannot make such deﬁnitive causal claims based on our evidence, this mecha-
nism is consistent with a growing literature on the returns to beauty in labor markets (Hamermesh
and Biddle, 1994; Biddle and Hamermesh, 1998; Mobius and Rosenblat, 2006). It also has poten-
tially important implications for political competition, for the selection of individuals into political
careers, and for the sorting of candidates across jurisdictions.
Our ﬁndings are consistent with an existing literature on the role of physical appearance in
elections. Rosenberg, Bohan, McCaﬀerty and Harris (1986) study the eﬀects of candidate attrac-
tiveness by constructing campaign ﬂyers for a hypothetical election. Hamermesh (2005) studies the
role of attractiveness in American Economic Association elections using students’ ratings of still
photographs. Analyzing a single election, the multi-candidate 1996 Romanian presidential race,
3Schubert et al (1998) found that electability ratings based on still photographs and brief video
clips correlated with ﬁrst-round voting outcomes. In the paper most closely related to our own,
Todorov et al (2005) independently show that ratings of competence based on photographs of Con-
gressional candidates predict election outcomes and vote shares. More recently, Berggren, Jordahl
and Poutvaara (2006) ﬁnd that ratings of physical attractiveness outperform ratings of competence
in predicting Finnish election outcomes.
We make several contributions relative to this existing literature. Most importantly, our re-
gression framework permits us to assess the incremental predictive power of personal appeal, after
accounting for economic and political predictors of electoral success and to compare the relative
predictive power of these factors. In addition, by manipulating the presence of sound in video
clips, our methodology allows us to separate the predictive power of personal appeal from the
role of other factors, such as party aﬃliation. We also show that participants’ predictions about
election outcomes deliver a more accurate forecast of actual results than do their ratings of candi-
date characteristics such as likability, physical attractiveness, and good leadership, suggesting that
participants are able to incorporate predictive information from factors beyond those commonly
included in existing studies. Additionally, our use of video clips from candidate debates allows us
to control for image quality, which may confound studies that use candidate-supplied photographs.
Our ﬁnding that adding sound to the video clips tends to worsen participants’ accuracy relates
to psychological evidence that verbal information can interfere with more instinctive visual judg-
ments (e.g., Etcoﬀ et al, 2000), and that individuals have diﬃculty ignoring irrelevant information
(Camerer, Loewenstein, and Weber, 1989). It may also help to explain why the election forecasts
of highly informed experts often perform no better than chance in predicting outcomes (Tetlock,
1999).
Finally, our evidence relates to the literature on economic and political predictors of election
outcomes in general (Fair, 1978; Alesina and Rosenthal, 1995), and to the literature on the predic-
tors of gubernatorial election outcomes in particular (Peltzman, 1987 and 1992; Adams and Kenny,
1989; Chubb, 1988; Levernier, 1992; Kone and Winters, 1993; Besley and Case, 1995; Leyden and
Borrelli, 1995; Niemi, Stanley and Vogel, 1995; Partin, 1995; Lowry, Alt, and Ferree, 1998; Wolfers,
2002). We show that naïve participants’ intuitive predictions perform comparably or better than
many of the variables emphasized in the literature. Moreover, while we do not conclusively demon-
4strate that factors such as candidate charisma have a causal eﬀect on voter behavior, the ﬁndings
we present constitute suggestive evidence of a role for such factors in gubernatorial politics.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the procedures for our
laboratory survey and for the collection of economic and political predictors of election outcomes.
Section 3 presents our ﬁndings on the accuracy of participants’ predictions of electoral outcomes,
and Section 4 presents our estimates of the relative strength of economic, political, and personal
factors in determining the outcomes of gubernatorial elections. Section 5 discusses evidence on the
factors driving participants’ ratings. Section 6 concludes.
2 Laboratory Procedures and Data
In order to measure participants’ forecasts of election outcomes, we showed them 10-second video
clips of major party gubernatorial candidates. Participants rated the personal attributes of the
candidates, guessed their party aﬃliation, and predicted which of the two candidates in a race
would win.
To study the eﬀects of additional information, we included three (within-subject) experimental
conditions. Most of the clips were silent. Some of the clips had full sound. Finally, some of the
clips had “muddled” sound, so that participants could hear tone of voice and other nonverbal cues
but not make out the spoken words. These clips were generated by “content-ﬁltering” the audio
ﬁles, removing the sound frequencies above 600 Hz, a common procedure in psychological research
(e.g., Rogers, Scherer, and Rosenthal 1971, Ambady et al 2002). The audio tracks on the processed
ﬁles sound as though the speaker has his hand over his mouth.
We used clips from C-SPAN DVDs of gubernatorial debates.1 By taking both candidates’ clips
from the same debate, we ensured that stage, lighting, camera, and sound conditions were virtually
identical for the two candidates in a given election. We used a total of 68 debates from 37 states,
with 58 distinct elections. In elections with more than two candidates, we focused on the main
1The C-SPAN DVDs are drawn from debates aired by C-SPAN during the gubernatorial election season. We
attempted to use every available C-SPAN DVD so as to avoid selection bias in the sample of elections we studied.
Conversations with Ben O’Connell at C-SPAN on July 25, 2006, suggest that the primary factors involved in C-
SPAN’s selection of gubernatorial debates are the compliance of local TV stations with re-airing, and the importance
of the election. While this latter factor would lead one to expect that more competitive races from larger states
are more likely to be included in the C-SPAN collection, in unreported regression models we ﬁnd no evidence that
debates from more competitive races are more likely to be included, and only weak evidence that debates from larger
states are more likely to be in our sample.
5Democrat and the main Republican in the race.
2.1 Participants
Participants were 264 undergraduates (virtually all Harvard students), recruited through on-campus
posters and e-mail solicitations. We promised students $14 for participating in a one-hour experi-
ment on “political prediction,” with the possibility to earn more “if you can correctly predict who
won the election.” We held 11 sessions in a computer classroom during 3-4pm on May 7, 9, 10, 12,
and 13, 2005; during 2-3pm on January 8, 9, 10, and 11, 2006; and during 2-3pm on March 2 and
4, 2006. We mailed checks to participants within a week of their participation.
2.2 Materials
The clips were generated by drawing random 10-second intervals of the debates during which the
camera focused only on one of the two major candidates. We dropped clips in which the candidate’s
name or party appeared, or in which the candidate stated his own or his opponent’s name or party.
For each candidate in each debate, we used three clips, the ﬁrst three clips that we did not drop.
The computer randomly selected one of these three clips for a participant to see. For each of these
three clips, we created a muddled version and a silent version by modifying the audio content.
Participants in diﬀerent sessions viewed diﬀerent numbers of each kind of clips. Because of
initial concerns that the silent and muddled clips would be boring to watch, each participant in the
ﬁrst session saw 15 elections with full sound, 3 with muddled sound, and 3 with no sound. Informal
interviews with participants after the session indicated that the concerns were unwarranted. In the
subsequent sessions in May, each participant saw 7 elections each with full sound, muddled sound,
and no sound. In the January and March 2006 sessions, participants saw 21 elections, all of them
without sound.2
The informal interviews also suggested that, after watching a number of elections, some par-
ticipants had diﬃculty recalling which candidate was which when answering the questionnaire. To
address this issue, we created still shots of each candidate by taking the ﬁrst frame of each clip.
From the second (May 9) session onward, the computer displayed the relevant still shot while par-
2Statistical tests show no diﬀerence in participants’ ability to forecast election outcomes across the three rounds
of sessions.
6ticipants ﬁlled out their judgments of each candidate. The computer showed the shots of both
“Candidate A” and “Candidate B” when participants made comparative judgments about them.
2.3 Procedure
Instructions were displayed on each participant’s computer screen, and an experimenter read them
aloud. The instructions explained that each participant would watch 21 pairs of 10-second video
clips of candidates for governor. Each clip in a pair would show one of the two major candidates:
one Democrat, one Republican. After each clip, the participant would rate the candidate on several
characteristics, and after every pair of clips, the participant would compare the two candidates.
Participants were told that they would be asked which candidate in each pair was the Democrat. To
encourage accurate guessing, one of the elections would be selected randomly, and the participant
would earn an extra $1 for guessing correctly in that election. Similarly, participants would be
asked which candidate had won the actual election and would be paid an additional $1 for guessing
correctly in a randomly chosen election.
We asked participants whether they had grown up in the U.S. and in which ZIP code. We did not
show any clips from an election in the state where a participant grew up. We also asked participants
after each clip whether they recognized the candidate and, if so, who it is. We dropped from the
analysis a participant’s ratings of candidates from any election in which the participant claimed
to recognize one of the candidates (although we still paid participants for accurate guesses about
victory and party identity in these cases). Because essentially all participants were Massachusetts
residents at the time of the study, we also excluded from our analysis any Massachusetts elections.3
In the May 2005 sessions, participants knew that they would watch some of the clips with full
sound, some with muddled sound, and some without sound. During the instructions, participants
listened to two versions of a sample soundtrack, one with full sound and one with muddled sound.
In the January and March 2006 sessions, participants knew that all of the clips would be silent.
After each clip, participants were asked to rate, on a 4-point scale, how much the candidate in
the clip seemed “physically attractive,” “likeable,” “a good leader,” and “liberal or conservative.”
After each pair of clips, participants answered “A” or “B” to each of the following questions:
3Participants whose home state was not Massachusetts did sometimes see clips from Massachusetts elections, but
the data from these clips were excluded from our analysis.
7• In which clip did you like the speaker more?
• One of these candidates is a Democrat, and one is a Republican. Which one do you think is
the Democrat?
• Who would you vote for in an election in your home state?
If you do not live in the U.S., please answer this question as best you can for Massachusetts.
• Who do you think actually won this election for governor?
After all the clips were ﬁnished, we asked participants to rate (on a 4-point scale) how lib-
eral/conservative they considered themselves, which political party they identiﬁed with more strongly,
and how interested they are in politics. We also asked whether they had voted in the 2004 pres-
idential election or, if ineligible, whether they would have. Finally, we asked a few demographic
questions (college major, year in school, gender, mother’s and father’s education, and standardized
test scores).
In sessions four and ﬁve, we asked a few debrieﬁng questions at the very end of the questionnaire.
We asked, on a scale from 1 to 10,
• When you watched video clips with full sound [video clips with muddled sound / silent video
clips], how conﬁdent were you (on average) in your prediction about who actually won the
election?
• With full sound [muddled sound / silent clips], how conﬁdent were you about which candidate
was the Democrat?
We asked these two questions for each of the three sound conditions. We also asked participants
about their strategies for making predictions for full sound and silent clips.
2.4 Measuring the Economic and Political Predictors of Election Outcomes
We collected data on the candidates and outcomes of the gubernatorial elections in our sample
from the CQ Voting and Elections Collection (2005). We also obtained data on a number of
political and economic predictors of election outcomes. Because of the modest size of our sample,
8we tried to choose the political and economic predictors of election outcomes that seem to occur
most frequently and robustly in the empirical literature on explaining and forecasting vote shares.
We obtained the following variables in order to construct possible economic predictors of election
outcomes:
• Per capita income. Nearly all studies of the economic determinants of gubernatorial elections
include some measure of recent growth in per capita income (see Peltzman, 1987; Chubb, 1988;
Adams and Kenny, 1989; Levernier, 1992; Kone and Winters, 1993; Besley and Case, 1995;
Partin, 1995; Niemi, Stanley and Vogel, 1995; Lowry, Alt, and Ferree, 1998; Wolfers, 2002).
We obtained annual data on state per capita income from the Bureau of Economic Analysis
(<http://www.bea.gov/bea/regional/data.htm>). Because a number of authors have argued
that voters measure state economic performance relative to national trends, we have also
computed national personal income as the average of state personal income, weighted by
state populations as of 1995 (roughly the midpoint of our sample).4
• Unemployment rate. The unemployment rate is also frequently used as an index of state
economic conditions in models of gubernatorial voting, although it appears less often in the
literature than does income per capita (see Levernier, 1992; Kone and Winters, 1993; Besley
and Case, 1995; Leyden and Borrelli, 1995; Wolfers, 2002). We obtained annual data on state
unemployment rates from the Bureau of Labor Statistics 9<http://www.bls.gov/data/>). As
with income, we compute a national unemployment measure as the weighted average of the
state unemployment measures.
• Per capita revenues. A number of authors have argued that voters respond to state ﬁscal
policy (Peltzman, 1992; Kone and Winters, 1993; Niemi, Stanley and Vogel, 1995), and to
diﬀerences between a state’s ﬁscal policy and that of neighboring states (Besley and Case,
1995). Following Peltzman (1992), we use state per capita revenues as our primary measure
of ﬁscal policy. We obtained information on state revenues per capita from the Census at
<http://www.census.gov/govs/www/state.html>. In appendix A, we demonstrate that our
4We obtained data on state population in 1995 from the U.S. Census at
<http://www.census.gov/population/projections/state/stpjpop.txt>. We use the average across U.S. states
rather than reported national ﬁgures to ensure that the scale and deﬁnition of the variable is comparable between
the state and national indices.
9results are robust to using a tax-simulation-based measure as in Besley and Case (1995).
We also obtained data on the following political predictors of election outcomes:
• Incumbency status. Lee (2001) shows, using a regression-discontinuity design, that incum-
bency has a signiﬁcant causal impact on vote shares in congressional elections. We identiﬁed
the incumbent in each race (if any) using the CQ Voting and Elections Collection (2005).
Our measure of incumbency is an index equal to 1 when the Democrat is an incumbent, 0
when neither candidate is an incumbent, and -1 when the Republican is an incumbent.5
• Campaign spending. Levitt (1994) argues that campaign spending has a statistically reliable
impact on election outcomes in congressional contests. To measure campaign spending, we use
data from Jensen and Beyle’s (2003) updated Gubernatorial Campaign Finance Data Project.
This database provides information on the total campaign expenditures of each major party
candidate. Our primary measure of campaign spending is the diﬀerence in log(expenditure)
between the Democrat and Republican.6 In the six elections for which we lack spending
information for one or both candidates, we impute this variable at the state mean diﬀerence
in log spending over the 1988-2003 period.
• Historical vote shares. It is common to include measures of historical election outcomes in
regression models of gubernatorial contests, as a proxy for party strength. We compute a
measure of the average share of the two-party vote received by Democrats in the 1972-1987
gubernatorial elections in the state. We use this time period because it precedes all of the
elections in our experimental sample.
3 Participants’ Success in Predicting Electoral Outcomes
Participants in our study performed extremely well in predicting the outcomes of the electoral
contests that the video clips portrayed. Across our 58 elections, an average of 58 percent of
5Unreported regressions indicate that Democratic and Republican incumbency have similar eﬀects on the two-
party vote share, so that allowing for greater ﬂexibility does not signiﬁcantly increase the predictive power of the
incumbency status variable.
6As with incumbency status, we do not ﬁnd substantial asymmetries in the eﬀects of campaign spending between
Democratic and Republican candidates, so we do not lose much predictive power from constructing this spending
index.
10participants correctly guessed the winner of the election. With a standard error of around 2
percent, a t-test can deﬁnitively reject the null hypothesis that participants performed no better
than chance (50 percent accuracy) in forecasting the election outcomes (p =0 .002).
Participants’ ratings are also very highly correlated with actual vote shares across elections. In
ﬁgure 1, we graph the actual two-party vote shares in our sample of 58 elections against the share
of study participants who predicted that the Democrat would win the election. There is a visually
striking positive relationship between these two measures, and the correlation coeﬃcient is a highly
statistically signiﬁcant 0.46 (p<0.001). Moreover, the relationship does not appear to be driven
by outliers: the Spearman rank-correlation coeﬃcient between participants’ predictions and actual
vote shares is large (0.42) and strongly statistically signiﬁcant (p =0 .001).
A regression approach reveals similar patterns. Column (1) of table 1 shows that an increase
of one percentage point in the share predicting a Democratic victory is associated with an increase
of about one-quarter of a percentage point in the actual two-party vote share of the Democratic
candidate. This relationship is highly statistically signiﬁcant, and the predictions of our laboratory
participants account for over one-ﬁfth of the overall variation in two-party vote shares across the
elections in this sample. We will provide more discussion of the relative power of alternative fore-
casting models in section 4, but to give a sense of magnitudes the R2 of our laboratory-generated
predictor is only slightly lower than we would obtain using as a predictor a measure of the incum-
bency status of the candidates.
Indeed, there is reason to expect that the R2 in column (1) might understate the true explana-
tory power of visual forecasts, because of sampling error in participants’ ratings. To check that this
bias does indeed weaken our ﬁndings, in column (2) of table 1 we present results for the sample of
elections for which we have over 30 raters, where econometric theory would suggest a fairly limited
bias from measurement error. As expected, both the coeﬃcient and R2 of the model increase in
this case, with the coeﬃcient changing by about 10 percent. We have also estimated a maximum
likelihood model (results not shown) that explicitly models the sampling error in our measure.
In that model, we ﬁnd a coeﬃcient of about 0.27 on participants’ ratings, with an R2 of about
26 percent. Although these models indicate that our estimates of participants’ predictive power
are attenuated, throughout the body of the paper we will conservatively treat our sample-based
measures as though they were not subject to sampling variability.
11The remaining columns of table 1 discuss a variety of robustness checks. In column (3), we
restrict to cases in which both candidates are white males (about two-thirds of our sample), in
order to test whether participants’ accuracy results merely from race or gender cues.7 We ﬁnd
that the coeﬃcient and R2 on this restricted sample are comparable to those in the overall sample.
Similarly, in column (4), we include a control for whether the Democrat appears to be the taller
candidate, as judged from footage on the original debate DVDs (e.g., handshakes) not shown to
participants.8 (The clips we showed to participants show only the head and torso of one candidate
at a time, so it is unlikely that participants coul dj u d g er e l a t i v eh e i g h tf r o mt h ec l i p s . ) W eﬁnd
that height exerts a positive, but small and statistically insigniﬁcant, eﬀect on vote shares, and that
including this variable makes little diﬀerence for our estimate of the predictive power of participants’
ratings.
In column (5) of table 1, we use data from the 17 states with multiple elections in our sample
to test how well participants do at predicting diﬀerences across elections within a state. Despite
the reduction in precision that results from using a small share of the variation in the data, we
still identify a large and statistically signiﬁcant relationship between participants’ ratings and the
actual two-party vote share after including state ﬁxed eﬀects. The coeﬃcient in this regression is,
if anything, somewhat larger than the coeﬃcient in the cross-sectional regression in column (1).9
Figure 2 illustrates the strong within-state relationship between participants’ ratings and actual
vote shares.
A ﬁnal potential issue with interpreting our results as evidence of the forecasting power of
participants’ ratings is the possibility that, despite our eﬀorts to exclude raters familiar with a
candidate from our analysis, some informed raters remained in the sample. A ﬁrst piece of evidence
against this view is that, as we document further in section 5.1 below, participants in our sample
(who claimed to be unfamiliar with the candidates) were unable to do better than random guessing
7We coded these cases conservatively, including only those debates in which it was obvious from the video clips
themselves that both candidates were white males.
8T h ec o d i n go fh e i g h t sw a sd o n ef r o ms h o t ss h o w i n gb o t h candidates by a research assistant who did not know
the outcomes of the sample elections or the share of participants predicting a Democratic victory.
9Related to the issue of cross-state variation in party strength, there is also the possibility that participants’
responses are only eﬀective in predicting extreme landslides. To check this issue, we have estimated a model that
restricts attention to elections in which no major party candidate received more than 60 percent of the two-party
vote (about two-thirds of the sample of elections). In this case, the coeﬃcient drops somewhat, but the R
2 remains
essentially the same as in the baseline model, increasing slightly from 0.22 to 0.23.
12in identifying the party aﬃliations of the candidates.10 A second piece of evidence is that the
recognizability of candidates in an election is not related to participants’ accuracy. More speciﬁcally,
participants who claimed not to recognize a candidate were no better at forecasting elections in
which large numbers of other participants claimed to recognize one or more of the candidates. If the
likelihood of recognizing a candidate is correlated across individuals within an election (which our
data suggest it is), then this test suggests that even unconscious familiarity is unlikely to confound
our estimates.
4 Comparisons with Economic and Political Predictors
In this section, we compare the accuracy of forecasts based on participants’ predictions with political
and economic factors frequently used in election forecasting. The forecasting value of participants’
ratings survives controlling for these factors. Overall, we ﬁnd that the performance of our measure is
far better than economic factors, and comparable to some important political factors, in predicting
vote shares in gubernatorial contests.
4.1 Economic Predictors of Election Outcomes
Table 2 shows our estimates of the forecasting power of alternative sets of economic variables. For
each variable, we compute one-year growth rates, following a common practice in the literature
on economic predictors of gubernatorial election outcomes. We then create an index equal to the
growth rate of the variable if the incumbent governor is a Democrat, and equal to the negative
of the growth rate if the incumbent governor is a Republican.11 This speciﬁcation amounts to
assuming that the incumbent party is held responsible for the prevailing economic conditions at
the time of the election, consistent with Fair (1978).
In addition to computing the R2 for each speciﬁcation shown, we have also computed an out-
10This is so despite the fact that participants who told us that they had recognized one or more candidates in a
debate performed far better than chance in identifying political parties (results not shown). Thus, if our sample of
non-recognizers were contaminated, we would expect to see better-than-random matching of party aﬃliations, which
we do not. Moreover, participants were paid for correctly identifying the parties of the candidates, so they would
have had a ﬁnancial incentive to give the correct answer if they knew it.
11We obtained the party of the current governor from <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_United_States_Governors>.
If the incumbent governor was neither a Democrat nor a Republican, we coded the relevant index as having a value
of zero.
13of-sample measure of the ﬁto fe a c hm o d e l . 12 In particular, we compute the out-of-sample mean
squared error by estimating the model repeatedly, leaving out a diﬀerent observation each time, and
computing the squared error of the predicted value for the omitted observation. We then compare
the mean squared error of the model to that of a model including only a constant term. Finally,
we compute an out-of-sample R2 as the percentage reduction in mean squared error attributable to
the inclusion of the explanatory variable. This statistic gives us an estimate of how well the model
performs in explaining the variance of observations not used to ﬁt the model. Unlike the traditional
R2 (but similar to the adjusted R2), the out-of-sample R2 can decrease as more variables are added
to a model, if these variables do not achieve signiﬁcant increases in goodness-of-ﬁt.
For reference, the R2 of a model using the share of experimental participants predicting a
Democratic victory to predict the Democrat’s two-party vote share is approximately 22 percent,
and the out-of-sample R2 is about 19 percent. This indicates that our experimental measure can
reliably predict about one-ﬁfth of the overall variation in two-party vote shares, even when we use
the model to predict observations not included in the estimation.
In column (1) of table 2, we present estimates of a model that predicts election outcomes
using the one-year growth in log(state personal income) prior to the election year. As expected,
higher income growth is associated with greater electoral success, and the eﬀect is both economically
nontrivial and marginally statistically signiﬁcant. However, this speciﬁcation has an R2 of less than
six percent, with an out-of-sample R2 of around two percent. This out-of-sample R2 estimate is
consistent with Wolfers’ (2002) ﬁnding of a one to three percent adjusted R2 for economic variables
in explaining incumbent governors’ electoral performance. On the whole, then, our estimates in
column (1) suggest that income growth does predict election outcomes, but that its forecasting
power is weaker than that of participants’ ratings.
In the second panel of column (1), we show what happens to our estimate of the predictive power
of participants’ ratings, once we control for growth in state personal income. Not surprisingly,
we ﬁnd that inclusion of the economic variable leaves the magnitude and statistical signiﬁcance
of the coeﬃcient on participants’ ratings essentially unchanged. We also show the incremental
out-of-sample R2 of participants’ ratings; that is, the change in out-of-sample R2 from including
12See Goyal and Welch (forthcoming) for a recent discussion of the diﬀerences between in-sample and out-of-sample
forecasting evaluations.
14participants’ ratings in the economic forecasting model. This calculation indicates an improvement
of nearly 20 percentage points in the out-of-sample forecasting power of the model. These ﬁndings
provide further evidence of the robustness of participants’ ratings as an election forecaster, even
after conditioning on economic factors such as income growth.
In column (2) of table 2, we augment the speciﬁcation of column (1) by adding a measure of
the one-year change in the unemployment rate. This variable enters negatively as expected, and
its inclusion diminishes our estimate of the importance of income growth. However, the gain in
R2 is only two percentage points, resulting in an overall R2 of about 8 percent. Moreover, because
the additional variable does not result in a great improvement in predictive power, the out-of-
sample R2 measure penalizes the speciﬁcation heavily, resulting in a tiny negative out-of-sample
R2, that is essentially zero. In other words, adding the change in unemployment to the model
tends to reduce its out-of-sample performance. As the second part of column (2) shows, including
the unemployment rate growth measure does not meaningfully aﬀect the magnitude or statistical
signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcient on participants’ ratings.
A number of authors (e.g., Adams and Kenny, 1989; Lowry, Alt, and Ferry, 1998) have hypoth-
esized that voters judge states’ economic performance relative to the performance of the national
economy. In column (3) of table 2, we implement a model of this type, regressing vote shares on the
one-year growth in national personal income as well as the diﬀerence between state and national
income growth. Consistent with the “benchmarking” hypothesis, we do ﬁnd a positive relationship
between state performance net of national performance and vote shares, although the coeﬃcient is
small and statistically insigniﬁcant. Consistent with Wolfers’ (2002) ﬁnding that voters are sensitive
to economic factors beyond the control of governors, we ﬁnd a positive and statistically signiﬁcant
eﬀect of national income growth on the two-party vote share. However, the R2 of the model is only
seven percent, and the inclusion of the statistically insigniﬁcant measure of state growth relative
to national growth results in a negative out-of-sample R2 of about seven percent. Thus, although
our point estimates in this model are consistent with theoretical predictions, the model’s predictive
performance is relatively low. Additionally, inclusion of these variables does not aﬀect the economic
or statistical signiﬁcance of our measure of participants’ ratings, and including this measure greatly
improves the forecasting power of the model.
Besley and Case (1995) posited that voters judge states’ economic policies relative to those of
15their geographic neighbors. In column (4) of table 2, we implement this hypothesis as a predictive
model, using state revenues per capita as a measure of ﬁscal policy (Peltzman, 1992). In addition
to a measure of a state’s own policy, we include an analogous measure of the mean policy of
other states in the same Census division. Consistent with the yardstick competition model, we
ﬁnd that states are penalized for extracting more revenues, but that, for a given level of the
growth in state revenues, states are rewarded for being in a Census division with greater growth
in revenues. In other words, voters seem to reward a political party for keeping revenues low while
neighboring states’ revenues are rising. Although the signs and magnitudes of the coeﬃcients are
broadly consistent with the yardstick competition model, these two variables explain only about
six percent of the overall variation in vote shares, and have an out-of-sample R2 of less than one
percent. Moreover, their inclusion does not diminish the importance of participants’ ratings, and
if anything leads to a slightly larger coeﬃcient on the share of participants predicting a Democrat
v i c t o r y .T h u s ,w h i l ew ed oﬁnd support for the yardstick competition theory, its power as a purely
predictive model appears to be low relative to the personal factors we measure in our experiment.
The models in table 2 consistently conﬁrm the qualitative predictions of previous researchers
regarding eﬀects of economic variables on election outcomes. However, these economic and policy
variables in general explain a small portion of the variation in vote shares, and perform poorly
relative to our experimental ratings in predicting election results out of sample. Of course, the
speciﬁcations in table 2 do not exhaust the list of possible economic models of elections. In appendix
A, we review a much larger list of possible models. None of the models we explore has an out-
of-sample R2 above 10 percent, and in no case does the inclusion of a set of economic predictors
signiﬁcantly reduce the estimated importance of personal factors in predicting vote shares.
4.2 Political Predictors of Election Outcomes
Table 3 presents a series of regression models that use political variables to predict the Democrat’s
share of the two party vote. In column (1) of table 3, we attempt to predict vote shares using a
historical mean of the Democrat’s share of the two-party vote. This variable has a small, statistically
insigniﬁcant coeﬃcient, an R2 of essentially zero, and a negative out-of-sample R2.13 This ﬁnding is
13To check whether the weak performance of this variable is due to our use of a historical, rather than a recent lag,
we have re-estimated this model using the Democrat’s share of the vote in the most recent prior election (results not
shown). The ﬁnding that past vote shares do not robustly predict current vote shares is also true for this alternative
16not surprising, since party ideology tends to be more ﬂuid at the state level, meaning that political
parties often have diﬃculty maintaining long-term holds on governor’s oﬃces, even in states that
have reliable positions in national politics. As the second panel of the table shows, including the
historical election variable does not diminish our estimate of the importance of personal appeal as
an election forecaster.
In column (2) of table 3, we predict vote shares using an index of the incumbency status of
the candidates. We estimate that being an incumbent results in roughly a 7 percentage point
electoral advantage, which is quite similar to Lee’s (2001) discontinuity-based estimate of the eﬀect
of incumbency in congressional elections. This variable has an out-of-sample R2 of about 23 percent,
which indicates that the incumbency index is slightly better than participants’ ratings in predicting
vote shares. However, as the second panel of the table shows, including a measure of incumbency
status does not eliminate the statistical importance of our measure of personal appeal, although it
does reduce the estimated coeﬃcient somewhat.
In column (3), we predict vote shares using a measure of the diﬀerence in the log of campaign
spending between the two candidates. This speciﬁcation must be taken with special caution, since
a number of authors have argued that cross-sectional estimates of the eﬀect of campaign spending
suﬀer from signiﬁcant endogeneity bias (e.g., Levitt, 1994; Gerber, 1998). With that caveat in
mind, we ﬁnd that an increase of one point in the diﬀerence in log spending is associated with an
increase of about six percentage points in favor of the Democratic candidate, which is comparable
to Gerber’s (1998) instrumental variables estimate for Senate candidates but far larger than Levitt’s
(1994) ﬁxed-eﬀects estimate for congressional candidates. This variable has an out-of-sample R2 of
about 33 percent, which is larger than the ﬁt from laboratory ratings alone. In the second panel
of the table, we report that including the diﬀerence in campaign spending reduces the estimated
coeﬃcient on participants’ ratings, but this variable remains statistically signiﬁcant.
In column (4) we include all three political variables simultaneously. This model has an out-of-
sample R2 of about 36 percent, an improvement of about 16 percentage points over the model with
laboratory ratings alone, but only marginally better than a prediction based only on diﬀerences
in campaign spending. Including all of these measures diminishes the coeﬃcient on participants’
predictions somewhat, but the laboratory measure is still marginally statistically signiﬁcant. More-
speciﬁcation.
17over, although the incremental out-of-sample R2 of the laboratory measure is only two percent in
this case, when we restrict attention to elections with over 30 laboratory raters, the incremental
out-of-sample R2 rises to nearly 7 percent, suggesting that measurement error may be attenuating
the forecasting power of the laboratory measure.
On the whole, then, the political predictors we examine perform better than the economic
predictors, and are either comparable to or somewhat better than our laboratory measure in pre-
dicting election outcomes. The variable that most closely approximates the predictive power of
our laboratory measure is an index of incumbency status, suggesting that participants’ ratings are
comparable to incumbency status as a predictor of gubernatorial election outcomes.
We also ﬁnd that including a range of political variables diminishes, but does not eliminate,
the predictive power of participants’ ratings. From the point of view of evaluating the causal
determinants of election outcomes, it is unclear how to interpret this ﬁnding. If incumbency and
campaign spending can be taken as exogenous, then the evidence in table 3 would indicate that the
personal characteristics of candidates as measured by our laboratory-based index have a smaller
eﬀect on election outcomes once the eﬀects of incumbency and campaign spending are taken into
account. On the other hand, if (as seems likely) both incumbency and campaign spending are
endogenous to a candidate’s characteristics, then these regressions might indicate that part of the
eﬀect of charisma or other personal characteristics on election outcomes might operate through
candidates’ past election success or superior campaign ﬁnancing.
5 Explaining the Accuracy of Participants’ Predictions
Having established that participants’ election forecasts are highly predictive of actual vote shares,
we turn in this section to an exploration of the factors that inﬂuence participants’ ratings. We
show that policy inferences do not play an important role in explaining the accuracy of partici-
pants’ forecasts, and that if anything adding policy information to the video clips (by turning on
the sound) seems to worsen forecast accuracy. Next, we show that participants’ own preferences
over gubernatorial candidates are only weakly predictive of electoral success. Finally, we discuss
the possibility that participants’ accuracy results from their ability to detect candidates’ own conﬁ-
dence in their prospects for victory, and report that participants’ ratings are predictive even of the
18outcomes of elections that were deemed to be close at the time of the debate. Taken together, these
ﬁndings are consistent with (but do not deﬁnitively establish) the hypothesis that participants were
detecting aspects of candidates’ appearance and non-verbal behavior that could play a causal role
in the election outcome.
5.1 Policy Inferences
If participants are able to infer candidates’ policy positions from the video clips they saw, this could
potentially contribute to their ability to forecast electoral success. Some simple calculations suggest
that policy information is not likely to be an important component of participants’ prediction
process. Across the 58 elections in our study, an average of 53 percent of participants (with a
standard error of 2 percent) were correctly able to identify which candidate is the Democrat in
the contest after seeing the silent video clips. This average is statistically indistinguishable from
random guessing (p =0 .176).
We conducted an experiment to study how additional policy information aﬀects participants’
ability to forecast election outcomes. In our ﬁrst (May 2005) round of laboratory exercises, we
randomly assigned one-third of each participants’ elections to be silent, one-third to include the
sound from the original debate, and one-third to be “muddled” so that the pitch and tone of the
speakers’ voice was audible but the words were unintelligible.
As we expected, adding sound to the video clips greatly improved participants’ accuracy in
guessing the identity of the Democratic candidate. Part A of ﬁgure 3 shows that participants rating
elections with sound correctly identiﬁed the Democratic candidate 58 percent of the time, which
is highly statistically distinguishable from random guessing (p =0 .008). By contrast, participants
rating elections in the silent and muddled conditions correctly identiﬁed the Democrat only 52 and
48 percent of the time, respectively, neither of which can be distinguished statistically from random
guessing (silent: p =0 .540; muddled: p =0 .668). Additionally, although the mean share correctly
identifying the Democrat in the silent and muddled conditions cannot be distinguished statistically
( p =0 .237), the mean share in the silent condition is marginally statistically diﬀerent from that
in the full sound condition (p =0 .055), and the mean share in the muddled condition is highly
statistically diﬀerent from that in the full sound condition (p =0 .002).
The fact that only full sound–and not muddled sound–improves the accuracy of party identiﬁ-
19cation shows that the improvement in accuracy is not a result of information in the pitch or tone of
the candidates’ voices. Rather, it is the content of their speech that provides relevant information
on their policy positions.
Part A of the ﬁgure also shows that participants were more conﬁdent in their guesses of the
candidates’ political aﬃliations in the full sound condition than in the muddled condition, and
more conﬁdent in their guesses in the muddled condition than in the silent condition. (These
contrasts are all highly statistically signiﬁcant, with p-values below 0.001.) Although participants
were wrong to express greater conﬁdence in their predictions in the muddled condition than in
the silent condition, they were correct in thinking they had performed better in identifying the
Democratic candidate in the full sound condition than in the silent condition.
The results are very diﬀerent when we turn to participants’ guesses about the outcome of the
election, where the addition of sound to the video clips tended to worsen predictive accuracy. Par-
ticipants rating elections in the silent and muddled conditions correctly identiﬁed the winner of the
contest 57 percent of the time, but those rating clips with sound guessed correctly only 53 per-
cent of the time. Although the diﬀerences among these conditions are not statistically signiﬁcant,14
they contrast strongly with participants’ reported conﬁdence in their guesses, which indicates much
greater conﬁdence in the full sound condition than in the silent and muddled conditions. (The con-
trasts among the self-reported conﬁdence indices are all highly statistically signiﬁcant with p-values
below 0.001.) Additionally, the fact that performance in the muddled condition is so similar to
that in the silent condition suggests that it is the content, rather than the tone or pitch, of the
candidates’ speech that leads to the diﬀerence between the full sound and silent conditions.15
The ﬁnding that additional policy information worsens judgment has methodological and sub-
stantive implications beyond our study. First, from the perspective election forecasting, it suggests
the critical importance of ﬁnding naïve raters who are unfamiliar with the candidates in question,
and of not informing the raters of the policy positions of the respective candidates. Second, it
may help to explain why expert forecasters, who are highly informed about and attentive to policy
14This calculation of statistical signiﬁcance refers to aggregate, election-level comparisons of the overall rates of
successful predictions across diﬀerent conditions. When we take advantage of our within-subject design, by estimating
a regression model of the probability of a successful prediction as a function of rater and debate ﬁxed eﬀe c t sa sw e l l
as dummies for the experimental condition, we ﬁnd a marginally statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the full
sound and silent conditions (p =0 .078) and no diﬀerence between the silent and muddled conditions.
15Informal conversations with participants in our study suggest that they did in fact believe that the verbal content
contained important information for determining the election winner.
20matters, are often found to perform no better than chance in predicting elections (Tetlock, 1999).
5.2 Ratings of Candidate Characteristics
In addition to asking participants to judge how actual voters would respond to the candidates, we
asked them several questions about their own personal feelings about the candidates. We requested
ratings (on a 1-4 scale) of whether each candidate was physically attractive, likeable, and a good
leader. We also asked each participant to tell us how she would vote in a contest between the
two candidates depicted in the video clips.16 By comparing the predictive power of these ratings
to the predictive power of participants’ guesses about election outcomes, we can assess whether
participants’ guesses incorporate information beyond that contained in the factors they rated, and
relatedly, whether their guesses merely reﬂect their own, personal response to the candidates.
Table 4 shows that participants’ accuracy in forecasting electoral outcomes does not result from
merely reporting their own personal feelings about the candidates. Column (1) of the table shows
the two-way correlations between the Democrat’s share of the two-party vote and various participant
ratings. As the column shows, only the share of participants predicting the Democrat to win is
reliably correlated with the election outcome. The share of participants who said that they would
vote for the Democrat is essentially uncorrelated with the election outcome, and the diﬀerences
in the ratings of the two candidates are only modestly (and mostly statistically insigniﬁcantly)
correlated with the actual vote share. Only the rating of whether the candidate seems like a
good leader is marginally statistically signiﬁcantly correlated with the actual vote share, with a
correlation of around 0.23.
Comparing columns (2) and (3) reveals that the ratings of candidate characteristics are much
more highly correlated with participants’ own reported voting preferences than with their guesses
about the preferences of actual voters. This is consistent with the fact that these ratings are only
weakly related to actual election outcomes. Indeed, the one signiﬁcant exception is the rating of
leadership quality, which is highly correlated both with the share who report that they would vote
for the Democrat and with the share predicting the Democrat to win (and, as shown in column
(1), moderately correlated with the vote share in the actual election).
16We also asked the participant which candidate she liked more. Across elections, the share of participants who
report liking the Democrat more is very highly correlated with the share who say they would vote for the Democrat,
and has similar statistical properties to the latter variable.
21A closer study of the determinants of participants’ stated voting intentions is revealing about
the relative weakness of this variable in predicting actual vote shares. Among debates rated by
participants who described themselves as Democrats, 81 p e r c e n ts a i dt h e yw o u l dv o t ef o rt h e
candidate they thought was the Democrat, and only 20 percent said they would vote for the
candidate they thought was the Republican. Similar asymmetries are present for participants who
described themselves as Republicans. By contrast, Democrats and Republicans did not show such
own-party biases when asked to predict the winner of the election. These ﬁndings suggest that
participants suppressed their own leanings in forecasting election outcomes, but, as we would expect,
allowed these preferences to aﬀect their stated voting intentions. Because participants’ individual
political beliefs are not those of the state’s median voter, and because participants’ guesses about
candidates’ party aﬃliations were no better than chance, suppression of their own-party biases led
to superior performance in forecasting vote shares.17 This ﬁnding suggests that participants were
responding to information beyond their own personal tastes when guessing the election outcomes.
It also implies that the accuracy of naïve raters is likely to be greater when they are asked to judge
likely outcomes directly, rather than to gauge their own personal reactions to the candidates.
5.3 Candidate Conﬁdence
One possible mechanism for our ﬁndings is that candidates who are likely to win an election appear
more conﬁdent. If our participants detected diﬀerences in the conﬁdence of the two candidates and
used these diﬀerences to gauge the likelihood of victory for each candidate, then this mechanism
could potentially explain the predictive power of the participants’ judgments. If this mechanism
were operating, this would not diminish the forecasting value of participants’ judgments, but it
would call into question any causal interpretation of models such as those in table 1.
One way to test for this possibility would be to restrict attention to cases where the election
was considered to be close as of the time of the debate, so that candidates should be about equally
conﬁdent of winning. To do this, we searched the Lexis-Nexis and ProQuest news databases, and
obtained news coverage from the period before the debate. We code an election as close if either
the news article itself identiﬁes it as close or “a dead heat,” or if the polling numbers are within two
17Interestingly, we ﬁnd little evidence for individual diﬀerences in predictive accuracy: the accuracy of respondents’
guesses is not correlated with gender, SAT scores, interest in politics, or political preferences. Moreover, random
eﬀects models indicate little individual-speciﬁc variation in predictive accuracy.
22standard errors of equality. When we were unable to ﬁnd news coverage on an election, or when
the coverage did not discuss the likely outcome of the race, we did not code it as close. Among the
26 close races in our sample, participants’ ratings are positively but not statistically signiﬁcantly
related to the election outcome. However, when we restrict attention to the 22 cases in which we
have more than 30 raters for the election, we ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant relationship between the
Democrat’s share of the two-party vote and the share of our participants predicting the Democrat
to win (p =0 .016), and an R2 that is comparable to those we report in table 1. A maximum-
likelihood model that adjusts explicitly for measurement error conﬁrms a statistically signiﬁcant
relationship between participants’ ratings and the election outcomes. Although these ﬁndings do
not conclusively rule out candidate conﬁdence as the mechanism behind our ﬁndings, they do
suggest that participants’ ratings may have predictive power even in cases in which candidates are
fairly unsure of their prospects for victory.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper, we show that naïve participants can accurately predict election outcomes based
on short selections of video. The predictive power of participants’ ratings survives controls for
candidate, race, gender, and height, as well as for state ﬁxed eﬀects. Moreover, participants’
ratings outperform a range of models that attempt to predict election outcomes based on economic
circumstances. Models based on political characteristics such as incumbency perform as well or
better than participants’ ratings, but including participants’ ratings does tend to improve the
predictive power even of these factors. These ﬁndings suggest that the intuitive judgments of naïve
raters may provide valuable information for forecasting election results.
Because candidate characteristics may be endogenous to the political circumstances of the state,
our ﬁndings are best thought of as providing evidence on visual information as a forecasting tool,
rather than as a causal factor in determining election outcomes. However, if a causal interpretation
were appropriate, this would raise the interesting question of why all candidates for high oﬃce are
not immensely appealing along the dimensions we measure. We note, however, that the attributes
we measure may bring signiﬁcant returns in the private labor market (e.g., Biddle and Hamermesh,
1998) as well as in the political sphere. Moreover, although high political oﬃce may be a desirable
23position, political parties often oﬀer candidacy to high oﬃce as a reward for loyal service in lower,
less desirable oﬃces. Hence for a highly appealing individual, the expected return to a political
career may not be that great relative to other occupations.
The view that personal appeal yields large dividends in electoral contests suggests testable
hypotheses that we have not considered here. First, if appeal has a universal component that
translates well across locations, more appealing candidates may sort into larger, more signiﬁcant
jurisdictions in order to maximize the gains they reap from their personal attributes (Rosen, 1981).
Second, if policy positions carry intrinsic value to politicians, then highly appealing candidates
may choose to “spend” some of their electoral advantage by taking more extreme positions. These
hypotheses may themselves have important implications for the functioning of political markets.
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27Table 1 The predictive power of participants’ forecasts
Dependent variable: Democrat share of two-party vote
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Share predicting a 0.2424 0.2793 0.2721 0.2383 0.2794
Democrat victory (0.0618) (0.0597) (0.0990) (0.0714) (0.1138)
Democrat is 0.0215
taller (0.0305)
Sample All More than 30 Both candidates Relative heights 2+ elections
raters white males clear from video in state
State ﬁxed eﬀects? No No No No Yes
R2 0.2158 0.3075 0.1695 0.2600 0.5194
N 58 52 39 40 37
Notes: Results are from OLS regressions, with standard errors in parentheses. “Share predicting a Democrat
victory” refers to the share of experimental participants who said they thought the Democratic candidate
would win the gubernatorial election against the Republican candidate. “More than 30 raters” refers to
elections that were viewed by over 30 study participants. “Relative heights clear from video” refers to a
judgment from a selection of debate footage showing both candidates side by side (even though clips seen by
participants showed each candidate alone). All calculations exclude respondents who claimed to recognize
one or both of the candidates.
28Table 2 Economic predictors of election outcomes
Dependent variable: Democrat’s share of two-party vote
I n d e xo fo n e - y e a rg r o w t hi n : (1) (2) (3) (4)
log(state personal income) 0.5386 0.4470
(0.2948) (0.3067)
State unemployment rate -0.0186
(0.0174)
log(state personal income)- 0.0970
log(national personal income) (0.5985)
log(national personal income) 0.6221
(0.3115)
log(state per capita revenues) -0.2883
(0.2570)
log(per capita revenues in Census division) 0.4731
(0.2450)
R2 0.0562 0.0754 0.0684 0.0647
Out-of-sample R2 0.0172 -0.0000 -0.0665 0.0030
N 58 58 58 58
After controlling for the above:
Share predicting a Democrat 0.2392 0.2339 0.2358 0.2513
victory (0.0603) (0.0619) (0.0614) (0.0602)
Incremental out-of-sample R2 0.1973 0.1813 0.2283 0.2250
Notes: Results are from OLS regressions, with standard errors in parentheses. “Share predicting a Demo-
crat victory” refers to the share of experimental participants who said they thought the democratic candi-
date would win the gubernatorial election against the Republican candidate. “Index of one-year growth in
log(state personal income)” is equal to the one-year growth (relative to the year prior to the election) of
log of state personal income if the incumbent governor at the time of the election was a Democrat, equal to
the negative of the growth of log(state personal income) if the incumbent governor was a Republican, and
equal to zero if the incumbent governor was neither a Democrat nor a Republican. Other indices are deﬁned
analogously. “Out-of-sample R2” is the out-of-sample mean squared prediction error of the model (estimated
by leaving out each observation in sequence) divided by the out-of-sample mean squared prediction error of
a constant-only model. “Incremental out-of-sample R2”i st h ed i ﬀerence in out-of-sample R2 between the
speciﬁcation including participants’ ratings and the speciﬁcation excluding that variable.
29Table 3 Political predictors of election outcomes
Dependent variable: Democrat’s share of two-party vote
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Average Democrat share of two-party vote, 0.0178 -0.1957
1972-1987 (0.2004) (0.1582)
Diﬀerence in incumbency status 0.0737 0.0409
(0.0166) (0.0176)
Diﬀerence in log(campaign spending) 0.0642 0.0510
(0.0115) (0.0131)
R2 0.0001 0.2594 0.3580 0.4265
Out-of-sample R2 -0.0374 0.2279 0.3345 0.3565
N 58 58 58 58
After controlling for the above:
Share predicting a Democrat 0.2433 0.1609 0.1398 0.1122
victory (0.0625) (0.0626) (0.0586) (0.0593)
Incremental out-of-sample R2 0.2020 0.0662 0.0478 0.0215
Notes: Results are from OLS regressions, with standard errors in parentheses. “Share predicting a Democrat
victory” refers to the share of experimental participants who said they thought the democratic candidate
would win the gubernatorial election against the Republican candidate. “Average Democrat share of two-
party vote, 1972-1987” is the mean share of the two-party vote received by the Democratic candidate in
gubernatorial elections in the state from years 1972 through 1987. “Diﬀerence in incumbency status” is
equal to 1 if the Democratic candidate is an incumbent governor, -1 if the Republican candidate is an
incumbent, and 0 if neither the Republican nor the Democratic candidate is an incumbent. “Diﬀerence in
log(campaign spending)” is equal to the diﬀerence in the log of campaign spending between the Democrat
and Republican, and is imputed at the state mean when missing. “Out-of-sample R2” is the out-of-sample
mean squared prediction error of the model (estimated by leaving out each observation in sequence) divided
by the out-of-sample mean squared error of a constant-only model. “Incremental out-of-sample R2”i st h e
diﬀerence in out-of-sample R2 between the speciﬁcation including participants’ ratings and the speciﬁcation
excluding that variable.
30Table 4 Predictions, preferences, and electoral outcomes
Correlation matrix (p-values in parentheses)
(1) (2) (3)
Democrat’s share of Share predicting Share who would
two-party vote Democrat to win vote for Democrat
Share predicting 0.4646 – –
Democrat to win (0.0002)
Share who would 0.0723 0.3141 –
vote for Democrat (0.5895)( 0.0164)
Average diﬀerence in ratings of candidate as:
Physically 0.1492 0.2797 0.7939
attractive (0.2636) (0.0335)( <0.0001)
Likeable 0.1096 0.2982 0.8817
(0.4128)( 0.0230)( <0.0001)
Good 0.2270 0.6319 0.7329
leader (0.0866)( <0.0001)( <0.0001)
Notes: Table shows two-way correlation coeﬃcients, with p-values in parentheses. All calculations exclude
respondents who claimed to recognize one or both of the candidates.






































































































0 .2 .4 .6 .8
Share predicting Democrat to win
Notes: Figure shows share of two-party vote received by Democratic candidate on y-axis, and share of
experimental participants (in silent condition) who predicted the Democratic candidate to win the election.
Predictions from participants who claimed to recognize one or both of the candidates are excluded from the
analysis. Number of elections is 58.







































































































-.4 -.2 0 .2 .4
Share predicting Democrat to win (mean-differenced)
Notes: Y-axis shows share of two-party vote received by Democratic candidate, less the average of that
variable over the sample elections in the same state. X-axis shows share of experimental participants (in
silent condition) who predicted the Democratic candidate to win the election, less the average of that variable
o v e rt h es a m p l ee l e c t i o n si nt h es a m es t a t e .P r e d i c t i o ns from participants who claimed to recognize one or
both of the candidates are excluded from the analysis. Number of elections is 37.
33Figure 3 The eﬀect of policy information on forecast accuracy






















































































































































































Notes: Error bars are ±1 standard error. Data are from the ﬁrst (May 2005) round of the study. Number
of elections (for accuracy measures) is 33.N u m b e ro fp a r t i c i p a n t s( f o rc o n ﬁdence measures) is 57.
34A Appendix: Alternative Economic Predictors of Gubernatorial
Elections
In this appendix, we examine several alternative economic predictors of gubernatorial elections, as a
supplement to table 2. The discussion below refers to the appendix table. Each speciﬁcation in the
appendix table regresses the Democrat’s share of the two-party vote on a diﬀerent set of economic
predictors of election outcomes for our sample of 58 elections. For each speciﬁcation, we report the
R2, the out-of-sample R2, and the incremental out-of-sample R2 from adding participants’ ratings
to the model. We also report an “adjusted” coeﬃcient on the share of participants predicting a
Democratic victory, after controlling for the economic factors listed. In all cases, this coeﬃcient is
similar in magnitude and statistical precision to the coeﬃcients we report in table 1. In addition, in
all cases the out-of-sample R2 of the economic model is below 10 percent (and the incremental out-
of-sample R2 from participants’ ratings is at least 14 percent), indicating that these alternative sets
of economic predictors have signiﬁcantly less predictive power than our laboratory-based predictor.
In column (1) of table 2 we examine the predictive power of one-year growth rates of state
personal income. However, voters may be comparing current economic performance to the per-
formance as of the previous election, in which case four-year lags could be more appropriate. In
speciﬁcation (1) of the appendix table we examine the predictive power of the four-year growth
rate in log income. Consistent with Fair (1978), we ﬁnd that this variable is a weaker predictor
than the one-year growth rate, and has no out-of-sample predictive power. In speciﬁcation (2) we
augment speciﬁcation (1) by adding a measure of the four-year growth rate in unemployment, and
ﬁnd no improvement in out-of-sample ﬁt.
Speciﬁcation (3) implements a model in which voters completely ignore state trends and focus
only on national income growth in deciding how to vote. The one-year growth in national income
predicts about three percent of the variation in vote shares out of sample. Speciﬁcation (4) adds
the national unemployment rate growth to speciﬁcation (3), resulting in an out-of-sample R2 of
about 9 percent, the highest of our various economic forecasting models.
In table 2 we estimate a model in which voters compare state revenue growth to growth in
revenues of neighboring states. An alternative possibility is that they compare revenue growth to
national levels, which we check in speciﬁcation (5). In this model, we include the one-year growth
rate in log(state revenues per capita), along with the growth in the log of the population-weighted
average revenue of all other states. This speciﬁcation has no out-of-sample predictive power.
Although Peltzman (1992) uses revenues to measure state ﬁscal policy, Besley and Case (1995)
suggest using income tax levels as measured by the NBER’s TAXSIM program.18 In speciﬁcation
(6), we parallel the speciﬁcation in table 2, but use a TAXSIM-based measure of state revenues.
In particular, we compute for each state and year the state income tax liability for a married,
single-earner household with two dependents that earns $35,000 per year. While we do ﬁnd some
evidence that higher taxes provoke a voter response, this model has weak out-of-sample forecasting
power.
A number of authors (Chubb, 1988; Levernier, 1992; Kone and Winters, 1993; Alesina and
Rosenthal, 1995) have suggested that local races might be aﬀected by presidential “coattails,” in
the sense that voters may attribute the successes and failures of the president to others in the same
political party. In speciﬁcation (7), we predict gubernatorial elections using the Democrat’s share
of the two-party vote in the most recent presidential election, but ﬁnd that this speciﬁcation has
only weak forecasting power.
In speciﬁcation (8), we implement an alternative model of presidential coattails, in which voters
attribute variation in national economic conditions to the incumbent president’s party. The model
18See Feenberg and Coutts (1993) and <http://www.nber.org/∼taxsim/>.
35predicts the Democrat’s share of the gubernatorial vote using a measure of national income growth,
a measure of whether the president is a Democrat, and the interaction of the two, which may
be seen as a simple representation of a model in which national trends are attributed to the
gubernatorial candidate of the same party as the president. This speciﬁcation has moderate out-
of-sample forecasting power, successfully predicting about 5 percent of the overall variation in
two-party vote shares.
In speciﬁcation (9) we allow for voters to treat income growth and income decline diﬀerently. In
particular, we allow for diﬀerent coeﬃcients on income growth depending on whether growth was
positive or negative over the previous year, and we also include a measure of whether growth was
positive in the previous year. In out-of-sample tests, this speciﬁcation predicts about 4 percent of
the variation in the Democrat’s share of the two-party vote.
36Appendix Table: Alternative Economic Predictors of Gubernatorial Elections
Speciﬁcation Adjusted coeﬀ.I n c r e m e n t a l
Unadjusted R2 on lab measure out-of-sample R2
(out-of-sample R2) (standard error) of lab measure
(1) Four-year growth in 0.0229 0.2432 0.2011
log(state personal income) (-0.0197) (0.0613)
(2) (1) + four-year growth in 0.0401 0.2515 0.2281
unemployment rate (-0.0512) (0.0609)
(3) One-year growth in 0.0680 0.2317 0.1811
log(national personal income) (0.0294) (0.0607)
(4) (3) + one-year growth in 0.1539 0.2119 0.1485
unemployment rate (0.0918) (0.0600)
(5) One-year growth in 0.0354 0.2661 0.2487
log(state revenue per capita) (-0.0290) (0.0612)
+ log(national average state
revenue per capita)
(6) One-year growth in 0.0677 0.2265 0.2113
TAXSIM state taxes (-0.0233) (0.0625)
+g r o w t hi na v e r a g eT A X S I M
taxes in Census division
(7) Democrat’s share of two-party 0.0279 0.2343 0.1809
vote in most recent (-0.0185) (0.0631)
presidential election
(8) One-year growth in 0.1443 0.2286 0.1867
log(national personal income) (0.0485) (0.0593)
+ Democrat is president
+ Democrat is president ×
growth in log(national income)
(9) One-year growth is positive 0.1242 0.2223 0.1620
+ growth in log(state income) (0.0401) (0.0614)
+P o s i t i v eg r o w t h×
growth in log(income)
Notes: See appendix A for details.
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